摘要：2019年3月亞太SAT真題及答案-閱讀部分第四篇 是典型的社會科學科研型文章，主要的研究問題是文字描述和事物的熟悉度(familarity vs. strangeness)是否會影響我們對貨幣和商品的價值判斷。 2019年3月亞太SAT真題及答案-閱讀部分第四篇截圖如下： 2019年3月SAT亞太真題答案： 32、B 33、A 34、A 35、B 36、B 37、C 38、B 39、C 40、C 41、B 42、B 2019年3月亞太SAT真
2019年3月亞太SAT真題及答案-閱讀部分第四篇是典型的社會科學科研型文章，主要的研究問題是文字描述和事物的熟悉度(familarity vs. strangeness)是否會影響我們對貨幣和商品的價值判斷。
Princeton psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer and his New York University colleague Adam Alter believe that many of the economic decisions we make have little to do with objective value. Market choices have much more to do with the brain’s basic internal perception of the world and the way those perceptions shape our feelings of comfort and ease. In this view, even currency has no clear and absolute value within one national economy. Regardless of those numbers on bills and coins, money derives its true value at least in part from the individual mind. In a series of experiments, these two psychologists have been studying the marketplace cues that trigger psychological comfort or discomfort, and thus shape us as economic beings. They’ve found that our economic behavior is driven by the same fluency heuristic at work in the Moses illusion.
The basic idea is that it’s human nature to get anxious and wary when the world is strange or challenging. We’re more at ease around the familiar and comprehensible. Think back to the avalanche fatalities described in the introduction. Most of them happened in places familiar to the victims. That’s a version of the fluency bias, which is probably deep-wired from the days when the world was much more threatening. But the cues that signal us to be on guard in the modern social world—including the financial world—may not be obvious. Indeed, they may be almost undetectable at times. It’s these nuanced signals that the psychologists have been exploring in the lab.
Here’s an example of their work. Oppenheimer and Alter asked a group of volunteers to estimate how much of various commodities they could buy with a dollar. They were ordinary things like paper clips and gumballs and paper napkins. Some of the volunteers were given a regular old dollar bill, with George Washington on it, while others were given less familiar currency of the same value: a Susan B. Anthony $1 coin, for example. Invariably, the volunteers believed that the familiar old dollar bill was worth more—that it had more buying power—than the unusual currency.
That’s not logical, of course. But it was not a fluke. They got the same result when they gave some people a rare $2 bill and others two singles. It’s not as though people never see a $2 bill, and it does have Thomas Jefferson on it, after all. But just the slight unfamiliarity of the denomination was enough to make people devalue it. Why would this be? Oppenheimer and Alter believe this irrational behavior is rooted in our most fundamental mental processes: The world is full of stimuli of various kinds, some more familiar than others, and the brain is tuned to process the familiar ones rapidly, effortlessly, and intuitively. More difficult or alien cues require more mental work, more plodding deliberation; the brain switches to its more cautious and calculating style to be on the safe side. We intuitively know that familiar $1 bills are valuable items, but the dollar coin is an unknown commodity—and the difference shows just how hard it is for us to know the “value of a dollar.”
This is humbling to know. But there’s more. The psychologists wanted to see if the same cognitive bent shapes our perceptions and attitudes toward goods themselves, and they decided to use the typeface manipulation to find out. In this experiment, they gave everyone the same currency—the familiar dollar bill—but they made the commodities more or less accessible. Some of the “consumers” purchased the gumballs and paper clips from a form that was printed in a clear black font, while others had to select from a form printed in the difficult-to-read gray script—basically the same manipulation described before. The idea was to make the strangeness as subtle as possible, to reduce it to basic perception. Even at this most fundamental level, the differences shaped economic judgment: volunteers in the study consistently rated identical goods as less valuable when they came in an unfamiliar, cognitively challenging form.